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The United States (US) Department of Energy (DOE) has been planning to use civilian nuclear reactors 
for a military purpose--to manufacture tritium help trigger the power of nuclear warheads. In that 
nuclear deterrence is largely predicated on possessing nuclear weapons that will work and on the will to 
use them if necessary, the DOE initiative may add to US security. However, the new propaganda 
opportunities available to other governments and non-state actors possessing or seeking to possess 
nuclear weapons may detract from US security. The opportunities? That there is no need to comply with 
the long-time US Government (USG) insistence to clearly separate civilian and military nuclear activities, 
that any and all US civilian reactors may be engaged in military activities contributing to nuclear 
proliferation, that the USG has a sense of entitlement absolving it alone from nonproliferation demands 
that it deems inconvenient but that it expects others to obey. A second security concern is that the 
quest for greater reliance on nuclear power as a cleaner approach to hydrocarbon-based energy will be 
perceived as more dangerous by citizens in countries with civilian nuclear reactors or with plans to build 
them. According to reporter Matthew Wald, tritium decays at a rate of 5.5% per year. At what rate is US 
credibility on nuclear proliferation decaying courtesy of DOE plans? Perhaps one might ask children 
whose consternation, rage, and rebellion towards parents whose words and actions contradict their 
directives may suggest how political entities may react in the international community. (See Fried, C.B., 
& Aronson, E. (1995.) Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 925-933; Jackson, C., & Henriksen, 
L. (1997.) Do as I say: Parent smoking, antismoking socialization, and smoking onset among children. 
Addictive Behaviors, 22, 107-114; Stone, J., Wiegand, A.W., Cooper, J., & Aronson, E. (1997.) When 
exemplification fails: Hypocrisy and the motive for self-integrity. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 72, 54-65; Wald, M.L. (August 11, 1997.) U.S. to put civilian reactor to military use. The New 
York Times, http://www.nytimes.com.) (Keywords: Tritium, Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Weapons, United 
States, Department of Energy, Nonproliferation, Security) 
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